While the 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies were engaged in fierce battles on the Western Front, the 42nd Army’s 124th and 126th Divisions pinned down enemy forces near Huangchong Ridge and Fuzhan Ridge on the Eastern Front, while the 125th Division cooperated with the 38th Army to annihilate the enemy on the Western Front.
At the time, the enemy had deployed 130,000 troops on the Western Front in Korea, and a total of four divisions—numbering about 85,000 men, including 51,000 U.S. troops—on the Eastern Front. While our forces had 230,000 troops on the Western Front, we had only two divisions of the 42nd Army, totaling about 31,000 men, on the Eastern Front. In terms of troop strength, the disparity between the two sides was significant.
Without a doubt, the heavy burden of the Eastern Front battlefield fell squarely on the shoulders of Wu Ruilin, commander of the 42nd Army.
Fortunately, the U.S. and ROK forces on the Eastern Front did not commit all their troops to the direction engaging the Volunteers. Instead, they advanced separately along coastal highways or isolated mountain passes in scattered columns, leaving their forces dispersed. Almond, commander of the U.S. X Corps and overall commander of the Eastern Front, later remarked with no small amount of regret: "Our forces were spread too thin."
Huangchong Ridge was a vital military stronghold in the northeastern Korean Peninsula. Once the enemy crossed it, they would be able to launch a pincer attack against our forces from both east and west, placing us in a dangerous position. Therefore, the task of defending Huangchong Ridge was extremely arduous, which was an important reason why General assigned the 42nd Army to hold this position.
The mountains near Huangchong Ridge were high and dense with forests, making them well-suited for defense. Leveraging the terrain to deny the U.S. mechanized forces room to deploy, the 42nd Army used the mountainous terrain to stubbornly resist the U.S. advance. However, the weather in Korea at the time was quite poor; by October alone, temperatures had already plunged to ten degrees below zero Celsius.
Opposite the 42nd Army were initially the ROK Capital Division and 3rd Division, later replaced by the U.S. 1st Marine Division, totaling about 35,000 men. Numerically, the enemy did not hold an overwhelming advantage. However, the 42nd Army's forces were relatively concentrated and held the advantage of terrain, creating favorable conditions for a successful defensive battle.
Maintaining his composure and daring, Wu Ruilin issued a combat slogan to his troops: "Hold the dangerous terrain firmly and fight to the death with the enemy! Turn Huangchong Ridge and Fuzhan Ridge into the gates of hell; except for wandering ghosts and prisoners, not a single enemy is permitted to pass through!"
On October 19, the main force of the 42nd Army crossed the Yalu River from Ji'an into Korea.
On October 21, in a telegram to Deng Hua and reported to the Central Military Commission, General proposed that "a division should promptly advance to Chosin and its south, constructing defense-in-depth fortifications along the Tocksil-li and Old Chunjin line to safeguard flank security and the rear communications line of Kanggye."
The Volunteer Command placed Chosin on par with Huichuan, viewing them as two pivotal hubs that the Chinese forces had to "firmly control."
On October 22, the 42nd Army received the mission to block the enemy advancing on the Eastern Front and secure the operations of the main force on the Western Front. At that time, the ROK 3rd Division was already approaching Huangchong Ridge, the gateway to the Chosin Reservoir. The local Korean People's Army defense force consisted of only two companies, making the situation extremely critical.
While planning the combat operations following the entry of the Chinese forces into Korea, the Central Committee and the Volunteer Command consistently paid close attention to the Chosin Reservoir region. If the gateway to the Chosin Reservoir were lost, the two main railways and highways in the mountainous areas of northeastern Korea would fall into enemy hands, and the Chosin hub would be completely wide open to the enemy, destabilizing the entire frontline of the Chinese forces.
In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee and the Volunteer Command, the 42nd Army issued an telegraphic order at 13:00 on the 22nd to "control Chosin and resolutely block the enemy."
According to the original plan, the 124th Division, serving as the vanguard of the 42nd Army, had as its initial task upon entering Korea to pave the way for the 126th Division following behind.
The Great Leader believed that, given the enemy situation at the time, a single division was enough to wage a defensive battle on the Eastern Front.
On October 23, one battalion of the 124th Division and one battalion of the 126th Division were transported by truck to Huangchong Ridge and Fuzhan Ridge, entering their positions ahead of the ROK forces and engaging them in combat by daybreak on the 25th.
At 17:00 on October 25, the 124th Division reported:
The number of enemy troops moving north on the Eastern Front was increasing. In addition to one ROK infantry regiment, one tank battalion, and one artillery battalion stationed at Shangtong-li south of Huangchong Ridge, more than 40 trucks had arrived at Oryu-ri. Furthermore, another contingent of ROK troops had advanced from Hagaru-ri / Sinhung-ri to the south of Fuzhan Ridge and might advance north from there to coordinate with the U.S. and ROK offensive against Huichuan on the Western Front, or execute a tactical outflanking maneuver toward Mui-mul-li (east of Kanggye).
Consequently, the situation on the Eastern Front suddenly tightened.
Thus, the mission of the 124th Division changed: instead of heading to Mt. Sobaek, it was ordered to stay behind and take sole responsibility for the defense of the Huangchong Ridge area. With this, the force assigned to block the enemy on the Eastern Front was increased from the originally planned one division to two divisions, under the direct command of Army Commander Wu Ruilin and Political Commissar Zhou Biao.
On October 27, the main force of the 42nd Army fully entered the Huangchong Ridge and Fuzhan Ridge areas and made pre-battle deployments. The focus of this deployment was the Huangchong Ridge area, but only eight battalions were placed on the frontline. The vast majority of the other forces (ten out of eighteen infantry battalions) were held in reserve at the second echelon under the army and division commands.
This deployment took into consideration that fighting along mountain passes imposed geographical limits on the battlefield, making it impossible to deploy a large number of troops effectively. Keeping a larger force in reserve at the second echelon allowed them to move forward to reinforce the frontline defense depending on the situation, while also facilitating the organization of counterattacks and the handling of contingencies.
Geographically, both Huangchong Ridge and Fuzhan Ridge were located on the southern slope of the Kaema Plateau east of the Rangrim Mountains, facing Hamhung and Pukchong on the east coast. They formed a natural barrier obstructing advancement from the coast to the interior. The main peak of Huangchong Ridge stood at an altitude of 1,457 meters, and the main peak of Fuzhan Ridge at 1,445 meters. Towering, sprawling, and densely forested, the terrain was extremely perilous. The southern slope was steeper and the northern slope gentler, favoring defense over offense.
The 42nd Army's positions at Huangchong Ridge included strongpoints such as Hill 1115, Caofang Ridge, Yantai Peak, Songrongdong, and Eagle Peak, which overlooked the railway from Hamhung through Oryu-ri to Sasu and the highway from Hamhung to Kanggye. Strongpoints within the Fuzhan Ridge defense sector, such as Mt. Baiyan and Mt. Baiyi, overlooked the railway from Oryu-ri to Wonpung-ri and the highway to Kwangdae-ri.
Deng Hua later analyzed that the 42nd Army could have conducted a mobile defense on the Eastern Front, forcing the advancing enemy to slow down. However, seeing that the terrain at Huangchong Ridge was favorable, they adopted a static defense, engaging the enemy in repeated contention around Huangchong Ridge, which resulted in heavier casualties.
He believed this was a point worthy of attention.
Among all the armies of the Fourth Field Army, the 42nd Army was one of the more recently established. It had participated in many offensive operations and few defensive ones, and its military training had also focused primarily on developing offensive tactics. As soon as the 42nd Army entered Korea, its very first mission was to shoulder a blocking task in a foreign land where they were strangers to both the people and the terrain, resisting a proud and aggressive formidable enemy—a severe test for the unit.
According to the historical records of the 42nd Army, when Deputy Division Commander Xiao Jianfei of the 124th Division arrived at the vanguard position in the Huangchong Ridge area, he met Choe Yong-gon, a leader of the Korean People's Army. The Soviet military advisor accompanying Choe asked Xiao Jianfei: How many tanks and artillery pieces does a Volunteer army have? How many aircraft support them?
Xiao Jianfei replied: Not a single airplane, tanks cannot arrive for the time being, and artillery pieces are also few.
The Soviet advisor was greatly disappointed upon hearing this, saying: The disparity in weaponry and firepower compared with the U.S. forces is far too great. With such an inferiority, coupled with no air support whatsoever, it will be very difficult to accomplish the defensive mission.
Xiao Jianfei explained that the terrain at Huangchong Ridge was advantageous; as long as they controlled the key points, constructed solid fortifications, organized their firepower well, plugged the gaps, and relied on the fighting spirit and combat experience of their officers and soldiers, they would be able to block the enemy's advance. Yet the Soviet advisor kept shaking his head, refusing to believe that Chinese forces could fight this battle well.
The first to clash with the 42nd Army were the ROK 3rd Division and a part of the Capital Division.
On the night of October 27, to lure the enemy out and seize an opportunity for a counterattack, the 124th Division voluntarily abandoned the Caofang Ridge position. On October 28 and 29, the ROK 3rd Division, covered by more than 20 aircraft, launched an attack with considerable momentum.
The 4th Company of the 371st Regiment defended the Yantai Peak position tenaciously, enduring over 20 attacks by an enemy force ranging from a company to two battalions within two days. "Under extremely difficult conditions where food was scarce, subsisting solely on potatoes and tree roots, and resorting to stones when ammunition was exhausted," the company held its position, annihilating over 200 enemies. After the battle, it was honored with the title "Yantai Peak Heroic Company." The 4th Company of the 370st Regiment held its position under similar conditions for two days and three nights, earning the title "Huangchong Ridge Heroic Company."
At dusk on October 29, the 124th Division launched a counterattack.
At 16:30, more than 50 mountain guns, field guns, and howitzers commenced suppressing fire; at 17:00, the general offensive was launched. A total of eight infantry battalions participated in the counterattack. Three battalions on the right flank attacked Yantai Peak to cut off the enemy's southern retreat route; one battalion on the left flank advanced between Luocaoping and Shangtong-li, preparing to intercept reinforcements and fleeing enemies; four battalions in the center, coordinated with three Korean People's Army tanks, advanced along multiple routes to attack Yantai Peak. After establishing contact with the right-flank attacking force, they moved to encircle and annihilate the enemy.
The coordination of tanks in combat operations was unique among the mobile warfare campaigns conducted by the Volunteers after entering Korea.
However, once the offensive was launched, coordination among the various columns went awry.
One battalion on the left flank took a wrong turn and failed to arrive at the designated location on time to block the enemy.
After advancing to its assigned position, the right-flank attacking force, hearing no action from its neighboring unit, suspected that the entire battle plan had changed. Coupled with the breaking dawn, they withdrew on their own initiative.
Consequently, this counterattack failed to completely annihilate the ROK 26th Regiment as planned, routing them instead.
Over the next few days, two regiments of the ROK 3rd Division launched attacks on the Huangchong Ridge positions once more.
On November 1, the U.S. 1st Marine Division relieved the ROK forces in the combat zone. This division was an elite U.S. unit with a superior record in the island-hopping campaigns of the Pacific War and the Incheon Landing, distinguishing itself particularly for its firepower and mobility.
On November 2, the 7th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division, supported by more than 50 aircraft and over 40 tanks, launched a fierce assault on positions including Yantai Peak and Songrongdong, temporarily capturing the Volunteer positions.
At this point, the 42nd Army intercepted intelligence indicating that the artillery of the 1st Marine Division was deployed at Longshuidong, ten kilometers away from the main force, but guarded by only a single battalion. The 124th Division of the 42nd Army therefore decided to launch a counterattack while the enemy was unsteady on its feet, executing a night raid on Longshuidong to wipe out the enemy's artillery. Four battalions of raiding troops set out fully equipped under the cover of night.
Due to time constraints, this counterattack operation had not been approved by the army command.
The 1st Battalion reached the U.S. position first, but the 2nd Battalion, which was supposed to move simultaneously, was nowhere to be seen. The deputy commander of the 371st Regiment, accompanying the 1st Battalion, decisively stated: "No more waiting, let's strike!" Taken completely by surprise, the U.S. forces lost over a dozen artillery pieces. However, outnumbering the attackers, the Americans recovered after regaining their bearings and launched a counter-assault, retaking the artillery.
Why was the 2nd Battalion tardy? As it turned out, when the vanguard squad stealthily slipped into a U.S. height, they saw the Americans wrapped in sleeping bags inside their fortifications, snoring like thunder with only their heads exposed. Several soldiers swarmed in, and just as they were about to strike, one soldier suddenly cried out in terror: "Ghosts! There are ghosts!" Hearing this, the others also turned tail and scattered in a flash.
Deputy Battalion Commander Zhao Jisen, leading the detachment, was furious: "Even if they are ghosts, we must take the position!" The 2nd Battalion continued its attack, and those American soldiers became literal ghosts under the gun in their sleep. Gazing through the dim night light, Zhao Jisen realized these were Black soldiers. Coming from rural areas, the Volunteer fighters had never seen Black people before, which was why they had been startled.
Only the 3rd Battalion had good luck. As soon as they arrived on the western side of Longshuidong, they completely annihilated a U.S. reinforced platoon. The ambushed U.S. camp had left its artillery and tanks scattered casually across the riverbed, and several sentries were happily sipping foreign liquor. Consequently, the troops easily crossed the U.S. security perimeter, unleashed a volley of hand grenades, and completely destroyed over a dozen artillery pieces, while killing most of the sleeping Americans.
At dawn on November 3, the 3rd Battalion penetrated deep into the enemy's positions. Chief of Staff Xing Jiameng, leading the 3rd Battalion, ventured deep into the tiger's den to push further into the enemy's defense depth, where he encountered another U.S. battalion. Seeing enemy trucks driving back and forth constantly on the highway, the battalion set up an ambush, destroying nine jeeps and trucks and three howitzers.
The U.S. I Corps urgently deployed a regiment, supported by over 60 aircraft, to encircle the 3rd Battalion tightly. Because friendly and enemy forces were intermingled, U.S. aircraft circling overhead dared not drop bombs, creating an opportunity for the 3rd Battalion to hold out until dusk the following day. They killed 330 enemies while suffering 200 casualties of their own.
Fighting and retreating, the 3rd Battalion slipped into the mountains, covertly traversing the enemy's flanks and rear for three days and three nights without sleep or food, quenching their thirst and staving off hunger solely with mountain springs and wild fruit, before finally rejoining the main force three days later.
Due to the increase in U.S. and ROK troop strength, the 42nd Army units suffered a severe shortage of food and ammunition. Several counterattacks failed to achieve the anticipated results; instead, frequent troop movements, personnel exhaustion, and disrupted organizational structures led to severe difficulties.
On the morning of November 4, taking advantage of the fact that the 42nd Army's redeployment was not yet complete, U.S. forces spearheaded by over 40 tanks, followed closely by more than 200 trucks and armored vehicles, drove straight along the highway toward Zhenxing-li. The two battalions of the 124th Division defending the heights on both sides of the highway were isolated and cut off, yet continued to fight tenaciously. The few remaining Korean People's Army tanks launched independent counterattacks against the U.S. forces, but all were destroyed.
At 6:00 on November 6, the 42nd Army wired the Volunteer Command, suggesting that the 125th Division—which had been attached to the 38th Army participating in operations on the Western Front—be returned to its parent formation to strengthen the defensive forces on the Eastern Front.
This indicated that without reinforcements and counterattacks against the enemy's flanks and rear, the frontal defense in the Huangchong Ridge area would be difficult to sustain.
By this time, the Volunteer main force's counteroffensive on the Western Front had concluded, and the 42nd Army's mission to secure the main force's operations was likewise fulfilled. That day, Peng Dehuai instructed the 42nd Army to withdraw from Huangchong Ridge, shift to operations on the Western Front, and hand over its existing positions to the 20th Army of the 9th Corps, which had entered Korea to undertake defensive duties on the Eastern Front.
After the 42nd Army troops withdrew, U.S. forces occupied Huangchong Ridge on the 8th, but no longer dared to advance boldly, conducting only tentative attacks with a small number of troops.
From the start of their defense on the Eastern Front on October 27 to their withdrawal from the Huangchong Ridge positions on November 7, the 42nd Army fought 65 consecutive engagements over 13 days and nights, annihilating 2,774 enemy troops. During this period, the 124th Division faced danger several times and shifted positions on multiple occasions, but ultimately withstood the enemy's wave-like assaults, eliminating a total of 2,048 enemy soldiers, including 787 U.S. troops.
The 42nd Army's own casualties were also considerable; the 124th Division alone suffered 1,435 combat-related attrition casualties, including 425 killed in action, 165 missing in action, and 20 captured.
In terms of the achievements of various Volunteer armies, the 39th Army, which fought best on the Western Front, killed and wounded over 1,800 enemies. On the Eastern Front, the 42nd Army relied on two divisions to hold off 85,000 enemy troops for 13 days and nights, providing superior support to the warfare on the Western Front.
Therefore, for the entire First Campaign, the 42nd Army was truly the army that fought best, living up to its name. General and the Volunteer Command spoke highly of the 42nd Army's performance in the blocking action on the Eastern Front, forwarding *The Practical Combat Experience of the Forty-Second Army in Holding Yantai Peak* to the entire army and reporting it to the Central Military Commission.
The 40th Army dealt a heavy blow to the ROK 6th Division at Unsan, the 39th Army surrounded Yunshan City, and the 42nd Army made a strong showing in blocking the enemy on the Eastern Front. Battered by these strikes, the United Nations forces routed southward all the way. However, Peng Dehuai had no intention of letting them make an easy escape and had long since arranged for a unit to penetrate behind enemy lines—specifically the Kunu-ri and Sinuiju line—to execute a dual-sided encirclement with the intent of annihilating as many enemy troops as possible.
The unit assigned the infiltration and blocking mission was the Chinese Volunteers' 38th Army, commanded at the time by Liang Xingchu.
Why was this mission assigned to the 38th Army? Naturally because the 38th Army was a fierce force capable of fighting brutal battles. The predecessor of the 38th Army was an ace trump card and top-tier backbone of the Fourth Field Army, renowned for its prowess in fighting hard battles. Dating back to its earliest origins, this force could be traced back to the 1928 Pingjiang Uprising, meaning this unit was nurtured by General himself. Consequently, one can well imagine the high expectations he placed upon the 38th Army.
Yet the boasted ace main force, the 38th Army, suffered an inauspicious start and was hit by a stunning blow right out of the gate. Initially designated as the operational reserve, the 38th Army had just entered Korea when it received orders to attack Huichuan. The troops set out in a flurry, but the narrow highway was packed with a dense sea of humanity—retreating North Korean soldiers, official vehicles, and fleeing Koreans blocked the roads completely. To the utter fury of Army Commander Liang Xingchu, a vehicle belonging to the army headquarters was involved in a traffic accident, resulting in casualties among several headquarters personnel.
On the march to attack Huichuan, Yang Dayi, commander of the 38th Army's 112st Division, encountered an old North Korean army comrade. This man had originally been Yang Dayi's subordinate in the Fourth Field Army, so they naturally exchanged reminiscences upon meeting. However, this old comrade was full of negative energy, first talking up the prowess of U.S. aircraft and casting doubt on the capabilities of the Chinese forces. When he heard that the 38th Army was going to attack Huichuan, this comrade shook his head like a rattle-drum: "No way! There is an American Black regiment in Huichuan!"
Yang Dayi was greatly startled. Hadn't they been told earlier that it was just a ROK battalion? How had it turned into a Black regiment? Could their combat effectiveness be the same? Daring not make a unilateral decision, Yang Dayi hurriedly reported to Liang Xingchu, who in turn reported it to the Volunteer Command. This back-and-forth wasted precious time.
When they later went to Huichuan to check, there was no Black regiment at all; it was originally just ROK forces, and after a flurry of commotion, it turned out to be completely nonexistent. Having delayed the launch of its attack by a day, the 38th Army rushed into Huichuan only to find that the ROK troops had long since fled, ruining the annihilation plan.
According to plan, the 38th Army should have reached its designated position on October 28, but it did not arrive until November 2. By then, the United Nations forces had already begun a general retreat. The ultimate result was that the 38th Army's infiltration lacked vigor and failed to intercept the UN forces, causing the Chinese forces' plan to encircle the enemy to fall through, and failing to achieve the strategic objectives of the First Campaign.